I developed an initial SOP for DAO Task Forces and Committees. My goal is to provide the DAO, current task forces, and future groups with the tools and governance structure to best carry out their intended duties and navigate various membership obstacles. In short, we need processes to remove and add members and guidelines for membership and group review. We need to decide as a DAO if we agree with the proposed SOP and if we need a formal DAO vote to apply retroactively or if this SOP - when sufficiently reviewed and edited by the community - can be applied to all current and future task forces.
The TL;DR :
Individual task force members and the DAO can vote to remove elected members
The DTF extended multi-sig will be reviewed every 6 months
The default task force review will be yearly
Please review and comment on the full document here:
I agree with the SOP in its current form.
Yes.
No.
0voters
The SOP needs a formal Signal and Core Proposal to be applied.
In the document, I outline that there is no appeal process if a member is voted out of their elected position either by the DAO or the Task Force. I don’t believe an extra step or bureaucratic process is necessary or productive if the Task force votes with two-thirds majority to remove someone. If the wider Aavegotchi DAO feels that Task Force removed someone unfairly, a signal proposition could be raised to address the concern, essentially serving as an appeal process to further examine and prompt a vote.
This is clear and looks good, but the Code of Conduct Policy for Task Force and Multi-Sig members that’s in development is a critical piece. It will provide context while also highlighting the need for professionalism, teamwork, and reflective engagement as we move forward.
Transparency with DAO procedures & processes is important. Not all members will participate, but Sig & Core Props bring attention to things being discussed. The new DAO meetings will help as well - excellent idea whoever came up with it!
After thinking it over I no longer think a Code of Conduct or Behavior Policy is the best way to accomplish our goal of ensuring that agents of the DAO are operating within the members of the DAO’s expectations. This is a 30 year project and it would be impossible to foresee all potential conduct that would be detrimental to the DAO. It is also safe to assume that the attitudes and standards of the community will change over that time.
My alternative proposal is to stick with direct democracy: (1) allow any member of the DAO to initiate a removal proceeding, (2) allow all members of the DAO to have their views heard in a forum, (3) allow the members of the DAO to vote on whether the alleged conduct warrants removal.
One huge problem with a code of conduct is that it would not be self-effectuating. Just as the United States Constitution means what the majority of the members of the court says it means, application of the code of conduct would require someone to interpret and apply it to each proposed removal proceeding. For example, if someone proposed to initiate removal proceedings for a reason that could fairly be argued to violate or not violate the code of conduct, who would be the person to determine whether the allegations fit within the code of conduct’s permissible grounds for removal or not? I think it is prudent to leave these decisions within the sole discretion of the DAO at the time of the removal proceedings. This would provide flexibility to address unforeseen circumstances and ensure that the community’s standards are upheld.
I plan to submit the signal proposal this week for the Aavegotchi DAO Standard Operating Procedure fo Task Force and Committee Membership. This document has been extensively reviewed and incorporates broad edits and feedback from the community. Special thanks to @Gadfly for his invaluable contributions. Please review and comment if you have any significant concerns before I submit the sig prop.
I think 5.9 and 5.12 need to be reviewed further before finalizing.
5.9 - I think we need to consider how this would work in practice. If we have a mass exodus of signers and this procedure prevents us from appointing enough temporary signers to operate the wallet would that be okay?
5.12 - There is a discrepancy here requiring a majority vote to appoint as compared to 5.4 which requires a 2/3rds default majority to remove. It could make sense to have a lower threshold to appoint than to remove, but wanted to make sure.
Once we get consensus on those items and anything else anyone has concerns about I’d be happy to polish it up before Dr. Wagmi submits. I’m also happy to leave it in y’all’s competent hands.
For the sake of keeping the process smooth, fair and transparent, my only suggestion is to add a step between 5.1 and 5.2. This step would be to submit a full disclosure, no more than a one pager single spaced, explaining why this individual should be removed to the Aavegotchi DAO Forum. (Maybe also a vote attached for the DAO to decide on whether or not this is enough grounds for removal)
Maybe Dr. Wagmi you can put that into more elegant wording lol. Essentially what I’m getting at here is the need and a simple way to keep the entire community in the loop so fair due process can be happen, instead of backroom conversation happening and people quickly getting shuffled in and out without the rest of the participating DAO members knowing what is happening. All I ask is we start from a place of truth, fact, and transparency so that a fair due process can take place, no matter the circumstances.
It seems like the SOP is being crafted in reaction to a specific incident. While a specific incident can make the need for a policy like this apparent, crafting a policy that is overly vague about the process is short-sighted. A lot can change in 30 years. A lot can change in 2 years lol.
It’s important that we consider potential exploits and craft the policy with them in mind. Transparency and trust are hallmarks of web3. They need to form the foundation of this SOP.
