Creating and Upholding Standards for Governance Proposals (DAO Governance Committee)

I’d like to raise the idea of the DAO forming a governance committee. The primary objective of such a committee would be to implement and uphold standard requirements for sig props and core props.

Examples of proposal requirements:

  • What should be the overall format of proposals?
  • What details and specifications must be contained in proposals?
  • What standard language must be included in all proposals?
  • What is the standard for changes that are allowed between a sig prop and core prop?
  • What is the exact process for requesting a funds disbursement from the DAO foundation once a core prop has passed?
  • What other steps must be taken before posting a core prop?

Why do we need it?

I believe stricter standards and consistent processes are needed for proposals now that the DAO foundation signers are responsible for executing financial transactions based on them. The purpose of stricter standards and consistent processes is to remove ambiguity and ensure credibility.

Secondly, we need someone or some group empowered to post core props. This is currently a task that PC handles for the DAO, which is not going to be true forever. Unless, that is, we open up core props to be a free-for-all, which potentially makes the problem of setting and adhering to standards even worse.

How do we uphold proposal standards?

One potential way to enforce standards is to allow only governance committee members to post core props (today, only PC can do this, if I understand correctly). Core proposals would be submitted to the committee to be reviewed and subsequently published by any member of the committee who is willing to vouch for the proposals clarity and compliance with the DAO’s standards.

The committee should review proposals based only on their adherence to standards and clarity, without regard to the merit of the ideas. Feedback should be provided to the creator of the proposal to advise them of any standards that are not met and areas of ambiguity so that they can make revisions accordingly.

This would effectively require convincing a single committee member that the proposal is clear and in compliance with standards. Some may feel that this bar is too high, others may feel that it is too low. I think it’s an important point to discuss.

How will proposal requirements be set?

A governance committee should be responsible for writing templates and standards, in consultation with the broader community. The committee would propose new standards to be voted on by the DAO before they can take effect.

Who should serve on such a committee?

I would suggest an open election of individual members via weighted vote.

In my mind, objectivity is first and foremost required from someone on this committee. One must be able to judge the proposal only on its adherence to standards set by the DAO, setting aside any personal bias.

Nitpicky detail-oriented types usually handle this type of task well.

Lastly, it might be helpful to have at least one if not several foundation signers on this committee, as they will have insight into any challenges facing the signers when it comes to disbursing funds based on proposal language.


I think a small monthly stipend is in order. Perhaps maybe with a per-proposal bounty or some way to adjust compensation for members that contribute more or less to the process.

What other things could a governance committee do?

These are just ideas - stuff that has come up in discussion that might be useful for somebody to be working on, but it doesn’t necessarily have to be done by this committee:

  • Implement processes and tools to streamline workflows from proposal posted through to funds disbursement this chain needs to be impeachable. Sending 100K GHST to the wrong address because of a miscommunication is not an option.
  • Conduct a study of other successful DAOs and identify any good ideas we can steal borrow
  • Research and propose possible methods of on-chain voting power delegation
  • Review any potential changes to voting power calculation and quorom requirements
  • Review work for satisfactory completion (could involve bounties to outside contributors with specialized knowledge where necessary)

What should we call it?

Well, I just spit out governance committee to get the discussion going, but I do think words matter, so I’m interested to hear if there are other more suitable names.

Interested to hear what y’all think of the concept.


GOAT committee. Governance of Aavegotchi Things.


I really like this idea. I’ve said for a while that it’s weird that we need to wait for PC to post core props. Sometimes it can take quite a long time for them to get posted.

You also mentioned in discord that the pay could be on a per-prop basis, I like that too. We would know the work is being fairly compensated in that case. People wouldn’t be getting paid for doing nothing, and when more props are being posted, they can get paid more.

What process do you envision if someone posts a sigprop without any proper formatting? Would this group contact the individual and work on improving it? Would the sigprop just be removed and then contact the individual? I believe the last time you brought this up and it was discussed that this committee wouldn’t increase barriers to sigprops necessarily, it would be more to replace what PC currently does plus a little more.

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I was thinking that sig props would have only very minimal guidelines such as what exists today- anybody could still post a sig prop without any formal review. If that sig prop is going to be used as the basis for a future core prop, perhaps it does have some basic set of standards that need to be followed.

Speaking of which, the DAO needs to clarify when a sig prop can be used as the basis for a core prop.

Option 1) Every core prop needs a to-the-letter sig prop. This might mean that many ideas get multiple sig props:

  1. First sig prop - basic ideas, for feedback / gauging interest
  2. Revised sig prop - complete ideas, revised based on feedback - basically core-prop-ready
  3. Core prop - to-the-letter of the refined sig prop

Option 2) Somebody or some group is going to need to make a judgement call (hopefully with forthcoming DAO guidelines) about how much the content of a core prop can deviate from a sig prop. This is more or less what we do today, though that call is really up to PC, with feedback from the community. Today we don’t really have guidelines about what can change between a sig and core prop (the wording in the wiki seems to suggest that they shouldn’t change at all, but we haven’t honored that).

Option 3) Sig props are optional. Use them for getting feedback and gauging interest only.

I’m not sure which is the better option - #2 is faster than #1 but introduces judgement calls which always introduces the potential for conflict. As for #3, I would be interested to hear about the thinking behind the use case for sig props. Typically, petitions are used to lobby those with authority to take action, but in this DAO anybody could write a core prop and take action.

What do you think about the proposer paying the fee or part of it?

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Interesting! I think that might incentivize some positive behaviors (more focus on sig props as a feedback mechanism that respect VP) and more care and thought before moving to core prop.

I also was thinking about a tiered system where a smaller proposal would require a single reviewer, but a larger more expensive proposal would require more reviewers and a larger bounty. I see the reviewer as an important risk mitigator for the DAO - proposals that move more money pose more risk and could benefit from more eyeballs.

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Splinterlands does this. There’s 100,000 (I believe) DEC fee, which is about $80 atm.

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IHMO this is clearly needed moving forward and I would absolutely support this proposal. I too shall try and think of. name or acronym :slightly_smiling_face:

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