There was much discussion about quadratic voting in 1 Aavegotchi = 100 GHST vote. The theoretical foundation for quadratic voting is sound, i.e., weighing voting power through credits such that the cost of additional votes beyond one-person-one-vote increases not linearly but quadratically. Arriving at a consensus for Aavegotchi governance through quadratic voting, however, broke down around what should be counted towards those voting credits.
Allowing large whales to control all governance purely on the basis of $ghts holdings was unacceptable. But clearly large liquidity providers legitimately should have a major say in decisions that affect their investments. Basing voting on $ghst holdings alone wasn’t deemed fair because many gotchi owners had committed a significant portion of their $ghst to acquiring gotchis and wearables. And then how should game objects be valued: cost basis, current market value, some other basis? And what about factors like XP, which quantify engagement? There was a general consensus that community engagement in gameplay and governance should be weighted differently than passive financial investment.
This boiled down to a perception was that there were at least two different voting constituencies with different concerns: financial investors and gamers. Proposals were floated about how to weight the voting for these constituencies differently for treasury focused and other potentially dilutitive financial decisions versus decisions affecting rarity farmers and gamers. With the introduction of Realm parcels, Alchemica and, eventually, value-adding parcel development, determining what to value towards voting credits could become even more complicated.
I think the deliberative process broke down because of efforts to derive $ghst equivalences for every gotchiverse artifact and attribute. The intent, of course, was to derive weighting factors that would enable the broad gotchiverse community to have parity with the $ghst investment community in decision making, especially on matters affecting game2win. Creating different voting classes was explored but it didn’t progress very far because game2win decisions affect not only the DAO Treasury but the market perception of Aavegotchi vis-a-vis other competing NFT games and therefore such decisions impact market cap for all $ghst holders, not just gamers.
A path through the quagmire of complex vote weighting mechanisms might necessitate stepping back and reconsidering what really needs to be measured to determine weighted voting credits. Does every gotchi, its traits and the items in its pocket need to be quantified to derive a voting equivalence? I don’t know the answer to that question, but I think a voting scheme that is too complicated would do Aavegotchi governance and $ghst value more harm than good. The voting scheme should be easy to explain to any potential voter with a simple elevator pitch.